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Abstract 
 
The paper aims to explore the dynamics between components of public expenditure and 
debt using an intertemporal optimization framework. Public expenditure is classified as 
productive and ‘less-productive’ based on the rationale that an increase in the share of 
productive expenditure in total public expenditure (phi) affects public debt inversely in the 
long-run. The ‘second-order’ conditions resulting from the model demonstrate that when 
phi is less than or equal to half, an inverse relationship between phi and public debt will 
hold only if private investment stimulus is high in the economy. Beyond its optimal level, 
an increase in phi could still affect public debt inversely; however, this will be at the cost 
of ‘crowding out’ of private investment. To understand whether phi is the share of capital 
type expenditure in total public expenditure, an empirical analysis using Indian Public 
Finances data (1980-2013) is performed. Time series methods are employed to test the 
hypothesis that capital expenditure of the government is productive public expenditure. 
The correlation, cointegration and ECM results support the hypothesis of an inverse 
relationship between public capital expenditure/GDP and debt/GDP. Further, it is also 
observed that in the long run, a one percent increase in public capital expenditure/GDP will 
lead to a reduction in public debt/GDP by 0.84 and 0.09 percentage points for the Central 
and the Consolidated General Government respectively. Key policy implications point 
towards a scope for increasing public capital expenditure in the Indian economy while 
complementing it with private investment stimulus to stabilize public debt in the long run.  
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1. Introduction 
  
Public debt sustainability is vital for both industrialized and emerging market countries.  
However, in emerging economies, the painful economic adjustments associated with a 
financial crisis that are aggravated by an unstable access to capital markets are an 
important incentive to keep public debt within sustainable grounds.  One of the important 
methods to tackle this issue is to maintain fiscal balances in a way to offset the impact of 
transitory factors, thereby, preventing public debt from getting on to a divergent path. 
There is an abundance of literature on this issue, where tax based fiscal consolidation and 
its role in curtailing public debt is discussed. Furthermore, recent revival of interest in 
growth theory has led to deeper research on the link between public expenditure, growth 
and public debt (Alesina and Perotti 1999; Blanchard and Perotti, 1999; Giuliodori and 
Beetsma, 2004; Romer and Romer, 2007; Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Barrios, Langedijk 
and Pench 2010).  
 
More specifically, on the issue of expenditure based fiscal consolidation, Devarajan, 
Swaroop, Zou (1996) made a seminal contribution through their paper where they 
established a direct relationship between productive
2
 components of public expenditure 
and growth. Based on a dynamic optimization framework, they demonstrated that until the 
level of ‘optimal’ productive expenditure is reached in the economy, it is worthwhile to 
increase the level of productive type expenditures in the economy.  A number of other 
empirical studies that analyzed the relationship between components of public expenditure 
and debt, as discussed in the forthcoming section, followed. However, as far as the author’s 
knowledge goes, few attempts have been made to understand the direct link between 
components of public expenditure and debt so far. 
 
This paper attempts to add to the existing body of literature by examining the relationship 
between components of public expenditure and sovereign debt in an inter-temporal 
optimization framework. The aim of this theoretical exploration is to understand the 
dynamics of productive public expenditure with the level of public debt in light of the 
                                                 
2
 Productive expenditures are those components of public expenditure which contribute to future growth of 
output, and do not only satisfy current needs (Devarajan, Swaroop, Zou 1999). 
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consumption and investment choices of the representative agent in the economy. To 
complement the theoretical analysis and to test the implications of the model, an empirical 
exercise using Indian public finance data is performed. The key objective of the empirical 
analysis is to identify the productive components of public expenditure and to understand 
how they affect debt dynamics using stationarity, cointegration and ECM modelling 
techniques in the context of a developing and emerging economy like India.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the extant 
theoretical and empirical literature on public expenditure, private investment, growth and 
debt. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework that has been formulated in the paper by 
discussing the assumptions of the model, variables used, methodology, setting up of the 
framework, first and second order conditions followed by the implications. Section 4 deals 
with the empirical analysis of Indian Public Finance data. This part of the paper focuses on 
the reasons for choosing Indian data, the specific objectives of the empirical analysis, data 
sources, methodology, analysis and the key findings. Section 5 summarizes the key 
implications of the theoretical model and the key findings of the empirical analysis to 
discuss the issue at hand and to draw policy implications from the analysis. 
 
2. Previous Research: Public Expenditure, Growth and Debt   
 
To understand the relationship between public expenditure and debt, it is important to 
review both theoretical and empirical literature on the issue of public debt sustainability. In 
addition to the same, a review of the literature on public expenditure and growth is also 
important as it provides insights on the components of public expenditures that could affect 
growth positively and debt inversely. A brief review of the literature that points to possible 
complementarities between public capital expenditure and private investment is also 
imperative given the key implications of the theoretical exercise presented in Section 3.  
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2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings  
 
Arrow and Kurz (1970) in their seminal paper developed a model where consumers derive 
utility from private consumption as well as public capital stock. The literature on 
endogenous growth theories has further generated models linking public spending with the 
economy's long-term growth rate. Barro (1990, 1991) introduce government expenditure 
and classify public spending as consumption and investment expenditure. The empirical 
findings suggest that all non productive expenditures can have a negative effect on the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita in the long term. This would lead to higher level of debt 
as the growth rate will be reduced. However, in Barro’s models public spending only 
affects the economy's transitional growth rate, while the steady-state growth rate remains 
unaltered. Devarajan, Swaroop, Zou (1996) relax the assumption of exogenous public 
spending. They build an optimization problem with two types of expenditure, productive 
and unproductive. They find that there is an optimal level of productive expenditure in an 
economy, beyond which such expenditures can have a negative impact on growth, due to 
over investment in capital and diminishing returns to scale. Agenor and Neanidis (2006) 
explored a similar framework years later. They analyzed the possible optimal allocation of 
public spending among health, education and infrastructure, taking into account the 
dynamics between the sectors.  
 
The theoretical work of Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2005, 2007) was also an important 
contribution as they use an open economy model to analyze the effect of financing public 
investment through foreign aid. Their results show that an important determinant of the 
impact on growth is linked to whether the foreign aid is used for investment purposes or 
not. In their recent work, Christie, Rioja (2012) are able to demonstrate that fiscal 
conditions of the economy are a key determinant of the optimal strategy to finance public 
investment. Thus, lending support to the fact that public investment must be increased only 
until its ‘optimal’ point which can be reached at different points of times by different 
countries, depending on the level of economic advancement and other fiscal conditions of 
the economy. 
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 2.2 Extant Empirical Literature  
 
Carranza, Daude, Melguizo (2014) look at the relationship between fiscal consolidation 
and public investment in six of the main Latin American economies namely Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. They find that simple austerity measures that 
focus on cuts in current expenditures may not be appropriate for fiscal consolidation. They 
point to the case of Peru where fiscal imbalances were reduced by means of measures that 
favoured public infrastructure investment and placed ceilings solely on current 
expenditures. Gupta, Kangur et. al (2014) look at the effect of public investment on capital 
accumulation and growth. Based on an empirical analysis performed on a panel of low-
income economies, they find that the quality of public investment is statistically significant 
in explaining variations in economic growth. Panizza, Presbitero (2014) use a panel of 
OECD countries to look at the links between economic growth and public debt along with 
examining a causal relationship between them. Their results are consistent with other 
studies where a negative correlation between the two variables is found. However, studies 
such as Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014) do not find such a causal relationship while 
analyzing the data for the same set of countries for a similar time period even if the 
negative correlation exists. Thus, recent empirical literature has clearly shown that 
sovereign capital expenditure could boost economic growth and hence affect public debt 
inversely, in the long run. 
 
The empirical literature on economic growth and debt has also diverse results depending 
on the kind of economies analyzed (developing vs. advanced). Ortiz, Cummins (2013) 
analyze the IMF government spending projections for 181 countries by comparing the four 
distinct periods of 2005-07 (pre-crisis), 2008-09 (crisis phase I: fiscal expansion), 2010-12 
(crisis phase II: onset of fiscal contraction) and 2013-15 (crisis phase III: intensification of 
fiscal contraction) in light of the main adjustment measures used by these countries 
According to them, a disaggregated analysis of the different types of infrastructure is able 
to play a significant role in understanding the trade-offs between public deficits to close 
infrastructure gaps. Seccareccia (2012) discuss the modern "financial balances" view of 
fiscal policy while supporting a return to a view of long-term fiscal policy, which Keynes 
promoted and emphasize on the role of public investment as a tool in promoting long term 
7 
 
growth. They replicate the technique used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010A and 2010B) to 
analyze the effect of high public debt/GDP on the growth of an economy. Using a dataset 
of advanced economies they find that high public debt/GDP ratios do not necessarily 
reduce a country’s GDP growth. Thus, the relationship between economic growth and 
debt could be stronger for developing countries in comparison to that of their advanced 
counterparts. 
 
Bose, Haque, Osborne (2003) examined the growth effects of government expenditure for 
a panel of 30 developing economies with a focus on sectoral expenditures during the 1970s 
and 80s. Their main empirical result is that the ratio of government capital expenditure to 
GDP is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth, while the growth 
effect of current expenditure is not significant for a large group of countries. Gupta, 
Clements, Baldacci, Granados (2005) test the effects of fiscal consolidation and 
expenditure composition on economic growth in a sample of 39 low-income countries 
during the 1990s. The results show a strong link between public expenditure and growth , 
as fiscal consolidations achieved through current expenditures cuts are, in general, more 
conducive to growth. Higher current expenditures and domestic financing of deficit are 
associated with less favourable economic performance. Empirical literature with similar 
results includes Landau (1983) and Summers, Kravis, Heston (1984). Hence for the 
empirical analysis in this paper, based on the findings in the above literature, the 
hypothesis of productive public expenditure being capital expenditure is tested for Indian 
data. In fact, the cointegration exercise presented in section 4 on empirical results, 
reconfirms the hypothesis, for India, where capital expenditures emerge to be of productive 
type. 
 
Finally, since the theoretical model points towards a complementarity between capital 
expenditures and private capital, the latest debates on this issue would also be relevant for 
this paper. Cavallo, Daude (2011) using a panel of 116 developing countries show that the 
effect of public investment on its private counterpart would depend on the quality of 
private institutions in the country. In countries where openness to trade and financial flows 
is high and public institutions are good, a complementarity exists between public and 
private investment. Khan, Kumar (1997) state that some components of public expenditure 
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may be complementary with private investment. For instance, public investment in 
infrastructure and human capital formation could increase the productivity of private 
capital. Earlier literature such as Pradhan, Ratha, Sarma (1990) through their theoretical 
exploration find that public investment does crowds out private investment. However, the 
effect that public investment has on total investment, growth and distribution of income, 
offsets this crowding out effect. The theoretical exercise in this paper demonstrates a 
similar policy implication, as outlined in the next section of this paper. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
  
The representative agent model has become a dominant macroeconomic framework over 
the past decade or so for economists analyzing the optimal level of macroeconomic 
variables from a planner’s perspective. The basic structure dates back to the Ramsey’s 
(1928) study of the optimal savings and economic growth rate; although recent economic 
literature is more focused on all issues of macroeconomic policy. The theoretical model 
presented in this paper draws from the representative agent model and characterizes the 
general macro-dynamic adjustments in the economy following changes in the composition 
of government expenditure; namely productive and less productive.  Additionally, the 
consequences of government expenditure change in the composition of public debt and 
effect on the private sector is also explored. 
 
3.1 Framework 
  
Tinbergen (1952) and Theil (1958) were the pioneers of the theory of economic policy that 
models and recognizes the point that one of roles of the government is to carry out policy 
to attain certain objectives. Their work evaluated the effects of policy as loss functions that 
measured the deviations of an economy from its specified objectives. This framework was 
discussed in the context of dynamic and stochastic systems by Turnovsky (1977, 2000) 
which has been used as the framework for the model that has been developed in this paper.  
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Turnovsky (2000) uses a representative agent framework wherein the welfare of the 
representative agent is at the centre of the derivation of macroeconomic equilibrium. The 
government is benevolent and evaluates its policy in terms of its impact on the 
intertemporal welfare of the representative agent. The choice of optimal government policy 
is then analyzed in a purely static setting such that the issue can be analyzed using 
traditional public methods of Ramsey Taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). The 
framework that has been adopted for the model in this paper is a model of optimal taxation 
of capital wherein the characterization of the time path of optimal taxes in an intertemporal 
macroeconomic framework was used as in case of Chamley (1986). 
 
3.2 Assumptions 
 
The Assumptions of the model are as follows. Firstly, the economy is stationary. Thus the 
model does not encompass an environment of ongoing growth, so that all dynamics are 
transitory. Secondly, the framework is the representative agent framework where the agent 
maximizes his utility by choosing a certain level of personal consumption which enters in 
his utility function. Thirdly, the effects of some specific parts of government expenditure 
as a productive input, rather than as a consumptive good are modelled. Thus, g1 represents 
productive public expenditure and g2, represents the less productive public expenditure. 
Fourthly, the household and the production sectors may not be left consolidated, so that the 
private sector of the economy is modelled as a representative composite worker-
entrepreneur. Finally, the representative agent gets positive, but diminishing marginal 
utility from the consumption of private goods, capital is assumed not to depreciate and the 
tax rate is not more than sixty six per cent. 
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3.3 Model  
  
The representative agent’s problem is to maximize the concave utility function where he 
derives utility by consuming private consumption, c.  
 
0
( ) tU c e dt



                                                                                                                          (1) 
 
0cU   
0ccU   
 
This is subject to an accumulation equation, based on the law of motion of capital stock, k, 
private consumption, c, and government productive expenditure, g1, which forms part of 
the investment in capital by the government, tax rate, τ, and output, y.  This equation can 
be expressed as: 
 
1(1 )k y c g   

                                                                                                               (2) 
0(0)k k   represents the initial conditions. 
 
Output is produced by a neoclassical production function exhibiting positive, but 
diminishing, marginal physical productivity in capital and productive government 
expenditure (g1) , while (g2) represents the less productive government expenditure.; i.e. 
 
1 2( , , )y f k g g        
0kf   
0kkF   1
0gF   1 1
0g gF                                                           (3) 
 
Although it can be assumed that the production function is CES (Constant elasticity of 
substitution) and the specific relationship can be expressed as: 
 
1/
1 2 1 2( , , )y f k g g k g g
    
      
   
0; 0; 0; 1         
1      
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For simplification purposes a Cobb Douglas production function of the form in (4) is used  
1 2y kg g                                                                                                                            
(4) 
 
The government expenditure composition is also represented by the following expression, 
by virtue of which the government spends either on expenditure on consumption of goods 
or on investment in form of capital type spending. The revenue is given by tax rate times 
the output. Also, the share   (0 1)     , of total government expenditure which goes 
towards  g1 is given by: 
 
  
1 2y g g  
           
 1
g y
   2
(1 )g y  
                                                                                                    (5) 
 
Thus, equation (2) becomes the following: 
 
 (1 )k y c y    

 
or 
(1 )k y c      
 
And the production function now depends on k,   and   and can be rewritten as  
 
( , , )y f k    
 
In determining his utility maximizing decisions, the representative agent takes τ, β and r as 
given. To solve the formal optimization problem we construct the Langrangean expression, 
after substituting for y, in equation (2) from equation (3): 
 
.
( ) ( , , )(1 )t tH U c e e f k c k      
 
       
                                                            (5) 
 
12 
 
where λ(t) , is the costate variable associated with the budget constraint (2) and represents 
the marginal utility of wealth. Performing the optimization leads to the following first-
order optimality conditions; 
 
( )cU c                                                                                                                               (6) 
(1 ) ( , , )kF k         
                                                                                           (7) 
 
Equation (6) represents the static efficiency conditions. It asserts that for the consumer to 
be in equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption must equal the marginal utility of 
wealth.  Equation (7) represents the fact that the rate of growth of marginal utility of 
wealth depends on the rate of change of consumer time preference (constant), the tax rate 
and the marginal product of the output. 
 
The equation (6) can be solved in the form 
 
( )c c                                                                                                                                  (8) 
 
Using (8), we may substitute for c, into the utility function U, to generate the indirect 
utility function 
   ( )U c V 
                                                                                                                   (9) 
 
which expresses the optimized level of the representative agent’s utility in terms of the 
marginal utility. 
 
The policymaker’s optimal productive government expenditure problem is assumed to 
maximize the welfare of the representative agent, subject to (i) the economy-wide resource 
constraint, (ii) the government’s budget constraint and (iii) the representative agent’s 
optimality conditions.  
 
Formally, this is described by the problem: 
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Maximize  
 
0
tV e dt



                                                                                                                       (10) 
subject to  
( , , )(1 )k f k c                                                                                                       (11) 
(1 )b g r b                                                                                                                     (12) 
(1 )b y r b     
 
together with equation (7). The following Langrangean expression can be constructed: 
 
 
 
1
2
3
( , , )(1 )
(1 )
(1 ) ( , , )
t t
t
t t
k
H e V e f k c k
e y r b b
e F k ve r
 

 
     
  
        
 
 
        
     
       



                                                      (13) 
  
where i are the costate variables associated with the accompanying dynamic constraints. 
The quantity v ≥ 0 is a multiplier associated with the nonnegativity constraint ,         
 r-theta >  0, then the constraint is binding. The multiplier associated with b, represents the 
marginal social value of public debt. It is also equal to the marginal value of replacing 
lump-sum taxation by distortionary taxation, that is, the marginal excess burden of 
taxation. Atkinson and Stern (1974) show how in a second best context such as this, this 
variable is negative. The first order conditions after deriving for k, b,  and   are as 
follows:  
 
The optimality conditions for this optimal policy problem include 
 
.
11 2 3 1(1 ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )k kkF k r F k                                                     (14) 
.
2 2 2(1 )r                                                                                                                (15) 
.
1 3 3(1 ) ( , , )k
V
c F k      


     

                                                                          (16) 
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1 1 3 3( , , )(1 ) ( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) ( , , ) 0k kf k f k f k f k                                           (17)                                               
1 1 2
3 3
( , , )(1 ) ( , , )( 1) ( ( , , ) )
( , , )(1 ) ( , , )( 1) 0k k
f k f k f k rb
f k f k


           
          
      
    
                            (18)                               
 
The first three equations are the dynamic efficiency conditions with respect to k, b and λ 
respectively; the last two equations are the optimality conditions with respect to   and  . 
In addition to this, the dynamic constraints (7), (11) and (12) must continue to hold. 
 
After substitution for y and solving 18 for b, we obtain the following: 
 
2
3 1
2
(1 )
(2 3(1 ) )
ky
b k
r
    
  

  
     
                                                               (19) 
 
To obtain a relation between b and  , we derive the above expression w.r.t   and obtain: 
 
 
2
23 1
2
(1 2 ) 2(1 2 ) 3(1 3 4 ) )
kb y
k
r
  
     
 
  
        
                                    (20) 
 
 
Productive expenditure can now be defined as that component of public expenditure an 
increase in whose share will raise the steady state growth rate of the economy. Thus, g1 
will be productive if the above expression is < 0. By this, we obtain the implications for the 
parameters of the model. Hence, putting this expression < 0, gives 
 
 23 1
2
(1 2 ) 2(1 2 ) 3(1 3 4 ) )
k
k
  
     

  
       
                                                     (21) 
  
 
Equation (21) shows that the relationship between phi and b  depends not just on the level 
of private capital and MUc  but also on the shadow prices of MUc , debt and private capital 
and the tax rate in the economy. 
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3.3 Key Implications of the Model 
 
To understand the implications of (21) and the entire theoretical exercise, three cases as 
outlined below are analyzed: 
1) 0  (low productive expenditure share) 
2) 0.5  (moderately high productive expenditure share) 
3) 1  (only productive expenditure share) 
 
Substitution in (21) yields the following: 
 
Case 1 
3 1
2 2 3
k k   
 



 
Case 2 
3 1
2
0
k  


  or  
Case 3 
 
 
The mathematical expression shows that for the inverse relationship between phi and b to 
hold, when productive expenditure is low (close to zero), the value of marginal utility of 
consumption must be lower than the value of private capital in the economy. The same 
scenario holds for the case when half of the government expenditure is productive. 
However, the proportion by which the values must be different is much lesser now. 
Finally, when the share of productive spending in the total public expenditure is very high, 
the value of marginal utility of consumption must be higher than the value of private 
capital in the economy, for the inverse relationship between phi and b to hold.   
 
Intuitively, this means that until a certain point, fiscal consolidation policies aiming at 
raising the level of phi must be accompanied by a stimulus for private investment to 
achieve a stable public finance situation. Nevertheless, this must continue only until a 
3 1
2 2
k k   



16 
 
certain point is reached. If the level of phi is already very high in the economy, the public 
debt situation may still be stabilized in the long-run. However, this will be at the cost of 
crowding out of private investment. This is also in line with the discussion by Devarajan, 
Swaroop, Zou (1996) about the optimal level of productive expenditure, where a shift 
towards an ‘objectively’ more productive type of expenditure, may not raise the growth 
rate if its initial share is too high. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
The extant literature on public debt sustainability in the Indian context is substantive. Most 
studies point to a possible unsustainable path of the public debt situation in India due to the 
inclination of the policy makers to focus on subsidies and other grant based expenditures. 
Chakravarty (2012) show that the spending on subsidies in India has been almost the same 
since 1991 (2.3%) and that among a sample of 27 emerging countries, India's general 
government debt ratio was among the highest. Also, the debt/GDP ratio reduction, between 
2003 and 2008 was at 9.2 per cent which is lower by 15 per cent when compared to the rest 
of the sample. Ahya et. al (2006) demonstrate similar results and state that the Indian 
public expenditure composition needs to be revisited as its focus is mainly on subsidies 
that have led to macroeconomic problems such as high real interest rates, low productivity 
of investments and slow growth. 
 
Literature supportive of the Indian public debt situation includes Asher (2012) who 
reiterates the IMF style method of checking for debt sustainability according to which the 
Indian debt/GDP ratio will fall from 64.1% in 2010 to 61.2 % in 2016. The most part of 
this debt is internal and public sector financial institutions are the key holders, thus there is 
less exposure to market risks. However, he warns that the primary deficit is persistent, and 
maintaining a large differential between real interest rate and GDP Growth will become 
more difficult. Kaur, Mukherjee (2012) show that the relationship between public debt and 
growth in non-linear in India using an estimation based on inter-temporal budget constraint 
and fiscal policy response function. They do observe a cointegration between revenue and 
expenditure, and that the primary balance responds in a stabilizing manner to the increase 
in debt but even they are skeptical of the persistent primary deficit. Buiter and Patel 
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(2004), using the stationarity tests developed by Phillips and Perron (1988) and 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992) argue that while deficits in India 
are large, the risk of a deficit-induced crisis is minimal. Jha and Sharma (2004) analysed 
this issue by using cointegration tests for public expenditure and revenue. Their empirical 
analysis suggests that the revenue and expenditure series are I(1) and cointegrated with 
regime shifts. Thus, Indian public debt may not be unsustainable. While the above two 
studies employed data solely for the Central Government, Goyal, Kundarapakam et.al  
(2005) analyzed the same issue for all levels of government. They test for stationarity of 
public debt as in Buiter and Patel (2004) employing the cointegration test developed by 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) allowing for structural breaks. The fiscal stance of the Central 
and the State Government at the individual level is unsustainable but it is weakly 
sustainable for the combined finances as inter-governmental financial flows are netted out. 
Thus, research on the subject of public debt sustainability for India, based on analyzing 
revenue and expenditure series of the government, as outlined above have not shown much 
consensus. 
 
Before embarking on the results of the empirical analysis, it would be useful to look at the 
division of expenditure powers between the Central and State Government in India, by 
virtue of the Federal Structure. India’s federal structures are an important aspect of its 
political and economic system. The Indian Constitution, in its Seventh Schedule, assigns 
the powers and functions of the Centre and the States. The schedule specifies the exclusive 
powers of the Centre in the Union list; exclusive powers of the States in the State list; and 
those falling under the joint jurisdiction are placed in the Concurrent list. The functions of 
the central government are macroeconomic stability, international trade and relations and 
those having implications for more than one state. According to the Indian constitution, 
current disbursements and defence expenditure are the responsibility of the Central 
Government, while the State Government is assigned infrastructural, social and health 
disbursements. Hence, the State Governments have more opportunities to engage in capital 
expenditure with respect to the Central Government. This could be one reason as to why 
the Capital expenditure levels to GDP of the Centre and general Government are lower in 
comparison to the State Governments. This is vice versa for public debt. 
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4.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Analysis 
 
The empirical analysis is based on annual  data series obtained from the Handbook of 
Statistics on the Indian economy (2013),  National Accounts Statistics published by the 
CSO
3
  and various issues  of Indian Public Finance Statistics. The time period covered in 
the analysis is from 1980-2013 and all figures are in Rs. billion. Table 1 summarizes the 
variables and their respective sources.  The three main variables used in the analysis are 
public debt, current public expenditure and capital public expenditure. However, since we 
want to analyze both nominal and real values of each of these variables, GDP and GDP 
deflator are used to obtain the ratio to GDP values and real values of the variables 
respectively. The analysis is done for the Consolidated General Government, Central 
Government and the State Government separately. 
 
 
The Consolidated Government public debt is defined as the sum of all the internal 
liabilities of the Central and State Governments together.  The internal liabilities of the 
Centre consist of internal debt, market loans and other accounts. Instead, the internal 
liabilities of the State Governments consist of market loans, compensation and other bonds, 
WMA (Ways and Means Advances) from the RBI and loans from banks and other 
institutions. Public expenditure components are classified under current and capital 
expenditure heads to avoid multiple expenditure components. Other expenditure categories 
for which the classification is not clear, are excluded from the analysis. For the Central 
Government, the capital expenditure consists of capital expense, capital outlay, capital 
defence expenditure and expenditure on loans and advances. On the other hand current 
expenditure consists of revenue expenditure, revenue defence expenditure, interest 
payments and subsidies. Since, the State Governments do not have the authority to spend 
on defence expenditure, the component of defence expenditure in both current and capital 
expenditures is nil. The summation of expenditures for State and Central Governments for 
each category is the consolidated general government expenditure. 
 
                                                 
3
 Central Statistical Organization, India 
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To obtain ratios to GDP of public debt and the expenditure components, we divide the 
respective variables by the GDP at current market prices.  In case of the State 
Governments, we make use of NSDP at current market prices. Further, to obtain real 
public debt and real expenditure components, we divide the given nominal variable by the 
GDP Deflator, obtained by dividing GDP market prices by GDP constant prices with 2005 
as the base year.  More specifically, Real variable = (Nominal Variable /GDP 
Deflator)*100.  All the data series are transformed into logarithms to account for possible 
non linearity and achieve stationarity in variance. 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 in the appendix show the time path of components of government 
expenditure and public debt, as nominal variables (percentage to GDP) and real values 
respectively for the Centre, General Government and State Governments respectively. In 
case of the Centre and the General Government, the Debt/GDP ratio is sixty and eighty per 
cent for the Central and General Government respectively. This is much higher when 
compared to the Debt/GDP for the State Government; thirty two per cent.  
 
4.2 Methodology  
 
Testing for causality or for cointegration between the two variables is done in three steps. 
The first step is to verify the order of integration of the variables since the causality tests 
are valid if the variables have the same order of integration. Standard tests for the presence 
of a unit root based on the work of Dickey and Fuller (1979) and KPSS (1992) are used to 
investigate the degree of integration of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
second step involves testing the cointegration using Johansen’s (1992, 1995) multivariate 
method to estimate the long-run relation between debt to GDP ratio (bt) and Capital 
expenditure (g1). Under this approach, a system of n endogenous variables can be 
parameterized into a vector error correction model:  
 
1 1 2 2 1 1....t t t k t k t k t tX X X X X D u                                                     (22) 
 
where Xt  is an (n×1) vector; Гi and П are (n × n) coefficient matrices; Dt are deterministic 
components, such as seasonal and impulse dummies; µ is a constant term; k is the lag 
length ; and ut is a vector of normally and independently distributed error terms. In our 
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system, Xt = [ bt , g1] is a (2×1) vector, and Гi and П are (2× 2) coefficient matrices. A 
cointegrated system implies that П = αβ’ is reduced rank, r, for r < n.    
 
The third step involves utilization of the vector error-correction modelling (VECM) and 
testing for exogeneity. Engle and Granger (1987) exhibit that in the presence of 
cointegration, there always exists a corresponding error-correction representation which 
implies that changes in the dependent variables are a function of the level of disequilibrium 
in the cointegration relationship, captured by the error-correction term. 
 
As a preliminary analysis to the cointegration tests, we calculate the Karl Pearson’s 
coefficient of correlation between  g1 and  bt for the Centre, State and General Government  
respectively. Column 2 of Table 2 in A.1.2 shows the results in tabular form. Public 
debt/GDP and capital expenditure/GDP share an inverse relationship for the Central and 
General government, while the coefficient in case of the State Government is too low to be 
interpreted. The vice versa is true for current expenditure to GDP for all the three levels of 
Government. Thus, in the Indian case, expenditures of productive type could be capital 
expenditures. However, we confirm this supposition by means of the cointegration and 
VECM analysis.  
 
4.3 Analysis and Findings 
 
In this sub-section, using the annual data for India or the period 1980-2013, the stationary 
properties of productive public expenditure/GDP and public debt/GDP and the order of 
integration of the data for the Centre, State and the Consolidated General Government 
respectively is analyzed. Second, the hypothesis of an inverse long-run relationship 
between productive public expenditure to GDP and debt to GDP ratios using bivariate 
cointegration systems and employing the Johansen and Juselius (1990) methodology is 
tested. Third, estimating the cointegration coefficients, the long-run equilibrium relation is 
defined. The deviations from this equilibrium represented by the residuals of the 
cointegrating vector, are included in error correction models to capture the mutual response 
of productive public expenditure/GDP and public debt/GDP in disequilibrium.  
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4.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
The uni-variate time-series properties of capital expenditure/GDP (g1) and public 
debt/GDP (bt )  are examined using the unit root tests developed by KPSS (1992) and the 
augmented Dickey Fuller (1979). The KPSS tests the null of stationarity, whereas the ADF 
tests the null of the unit root. If the KPSS test rejects the null but the ADF test does not, 
both tests support the same conclusions; that is, the series in question is a unit root process. 
Results of the ADF and KPSS tests are reported in A.1.2 in Table 3 and yield  similar 
results for the Consolidated General Government and Central Government. 
 
In the case of Consolidated General Government and the Central Government, the ADF 
tests cannot reject the unit root null in any of the indexes (ratio/log level) and the KPSS 
tests reject the null of stationarity for all indexes. At the first differences, the ADF reject 
the unit root for g1 and bt while the KPSS tests support the hypothesis of stationarity. Thus, 
ADF and KPSS tests confirm that both debt and capital expenditure are unit root processes 
and seem to be I(1) at 5 per cent level of significance for the Central and Consolidated 
General Government. In case of the state level analysis, the first differences seem to be I 
(2). Hence, the State government data of ratio to GDP variables is excluded in further 
analysis.  
 
4.3.2     Cointegration Tests 
 
Since the Johansen procedure is sensitive to a lag length used, we conduct a series of 
nested likelihood ratio tests on the first-differenced VARs to determine the optimal lag 
length prior to performing cointegartion tests. These are done by using Hayashi, Sims 
(1980) like-likelihood (LR) tests and multivariate Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
Under the LR tests, we begin with a maximum lag Length (k-max) of 7 and sequentially 
test down, deleting one VAR lag at a time until the deleted lags are jointly significant. As 
shown in column three of Table 4, the optimal lag length is different for each variable. 
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 Table 5 in A.1.2 shows the trace and Eigen-value tests for the cointegration rank r, for the 
two variables. For the consolidated General government and the Central Government, both 
the tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 0.05 levels. This means that bt and g1 are 
cointegrated.  Apart from the Johansen test we also perform the Engle-Granger test for 
cointegration since we have only 2 variables. The residuals are stationary for the Centre 
and the consolidated general government confirming the presence of a cointegration 
between the two variables. We infer from the fact that capital expenditure/GDP and public 
debt/GDP are cointegrated, (1) that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
two time series and (2) the existence of causality in at least one direction. Furthermore, the 
deviations of these variables from the equilibrium are stationary, with finite variance, even 
though the series themselves are non stationary and have finite variance.   
 
In case of the Central Government, the loading factor, which also measures the speed of 
adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium value is correctly signed (negative). This 
implies that the long-run equilibrium deviation has a significant impact on public debt. The 
public debt adjusts at the rate of 0.04 percentage points every year to achieve long-run 
equilibrium when there is a deviation from the equilibrium. In case of the Consolidated 
General Government, the loading factor is negative as well and public debt adjusts at the 
rate of less than 0.13 percentage points every year to achieve long-run equilibrium when 
there is a deviation from   the equilibrium. 
 
4.3.3 VECM Model 
 
We reparametrize the VAR into a vector error correction model using the Johansen 
framework. Table 6 in A.1.2 shows the results of the VECM representations. The overall 
R
2
 is 0.70 and 0.61 respectively for the Consolidated and Central Governments 
respectively.  
 
The coefficient of the cointegration equation is significant in case of the General and 
Central Government with low standard errors. The positive sign suggests that changes in 
capital expenditure adjust in the same direction to the previous period’s deviation from 
equilibrium.  This also helps in understanding the nature of relationship between the two 
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variables. It also means that 0.20 and 0.05 percentage points of disequilibrium in case of 
general government and Central Government respectively is corrected is corrected within 
one year. 
 
The coefficient represented in the last column of Table 6 shows that in case of 
Consolidated general government and the Central Government helps in understanding, the 
level of adjustment / disequilibrium corrected in the public debt to GDP by a change in the 
capital expenditure. Thus, a 1 per cent increase in capital expenditure reduces public debt 
by 0.84 per cent, in the long run for the Consolidated General Government. In case of the 
Central Government, an increase of 1 per cent in capital expenditure reduces public debt in 
the long run by 0.09 per cent. This also confirms the inverse relationship between the two 
variables. 
 
 
5.     Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
Debt sustainability has become a very vibrant issue in the current world scenario with 
many industrialized countries succumbing to unsustainable budget deficits and debt levels. 
However, the approach towards implementation of austerity measures is focussed on wage 
and expenditure cuts. In this paper, the relationship between productive public expenditure 
and public debt is analyzed using inter-temporal optimization. This is followed by an 
empirical exercise that using Indian government data analyzes whether specific 
components of public expenditure do share a long-run relationship with debt and if the 
relationship in itself is inverse. 
 
The theoretical analysis in the paper shows that when the share of productive expenditure 
in total public expenditure (phi) is less than 0.5, for the inverse relationship between phi 
and debt to hold, stimulus for private investment must also be present in the economy. 
However, this should only continue till the point when the optimal level of phi is reached.  
Beyond the optimal level, an increase in phi might be able to reduce public debt. However, 
this will be at the cost of shrinking private investment. This is also in line with the 
discussion by Devarajan, Swaroop, Zou (1996) about the optimal level of productive 
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expenditure, where a shift towards an ‘objectively’ more productive type of expenditure, 
may not raise the growth rate if its initial share is too high. The empirical analysis of the 
paper shows that capital expenditure of the Indian government shares an inverse long-run 
relationship with Indian Sovereign debt while the relationship is vice versa for current 
expenditures. The cumulative analysis of the paper’s findings points towards a possible 
complementarity between public and private investment/capital expenditures for reducing 
public debt in the long run.  
 
In summary, the papers findings show that random expenditure cuts cannot help in 
stabilizing the levels of public debt. Instead, the quality of expenditure cuts matters. When 
fiscal consolidation is implemented focus should be on cutting current expenditures as far 
as possible and increasing capital type expenditures along with stimulating private 
investment for a smoother repayment path.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Note on usage of Real Variables  
 
The tables presented in Appendix A.1.2 show the empirical analysis for ratios to GDP of 
capital expenditures, current expenditures and public debt. Additionally, the analysis with 
real variables is also presented in the appendix. While no reference is made to real 
variables in the body of the paper, each of the analysis carried out for the ratio to GDP 
variables was also done for their real counterparts.  
            The correlation coefficients for the real variables were too high and hence were 
considered spurious. However, the stationarity test for all the three levels of Government 
showed that the time series for each of these variables was weakly stationary in their first 
differences. In the cointegration analysis, no cointegration vector was found among the 
variables of the Centre and Consolidated General government. Instead, a cointegration 
relationship with an appropriate loading coefficient was found in case of State 
Government. The Cointegration relationship for the State Government was presented in the 
ECM framework and a positive relationship was found between capital expenditures and 
debt. This could be due to the fact that the increase in real GDP is not enough to facilitate a 
real decrease in debt.  
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A.1.1 Figures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Central Government: Major Fiscal Variables  
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
Notes: RADEBT refers to Debt/GDP, RCUEXP refers to Current exp/GDP and RACAPEXP refers to 
Capital expenditure/GDP 
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Figure 2. General Government: Major Fiscal Variables  
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
Notes: RADEBT refers to Debt/GDP, RACUEXP refers to Current exp/GDP and RACAPEXP refers 
to Capital expenditure/GDP 
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Figure 3. State Government: Major Fiscal Variables  
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
 
 
Notes: RADEBT refers to Debt/GDP, RACUEXP refers to Current exp/GDP and RACAPEXP refers 
to Capital expenditure/GDP 
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A.1.2 Tables  
 
Table1. Description of Variables  
 
 
Variables used Type of Government Source 
Capital Expenditure 
Centre, State and General 
Government 
RBI Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy (2013-14) 
Current expenditure 
Centre, State and General 
Government 
RBI Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy (2013-14) & 
CSO (National Accounts statistics) 
Public Debt 
Centre, State and General 
Government 
RBI Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy (2013-14) 
GDP 
Centre and General 
Government 
RBI Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy (2013-14) 
NSDP State Government 
Indian Public Finance Statistics 
(2013-14) 
GDP Deflator 
Centre, State and General 
Government 
IMF Online Statistics on Indian 
Economy 2013-14 
 
(Source: Author’s elaboration on data sources mentioned in Table 1) 
 
 
Table2. Karl Pearson’s correlation coefficient of Current and Capital expenditure with Public Debt 
 
 
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General Government 
 
Central Government 
 
State Government 
 Current 
Exp & Debt 
Capital  
Exp & Debt 
Current 
Exp & Debt 
Capital  
Exp & Debt 
Current  
Exp &  Debt 
Capital  
Exp &  Debt 
Ratio 
/GDP 
0.79 -0.63 0.75 -0.63 0.62 -0.08 
Real 
Variab
les 
0.97 0.92 0.98 0.67 0.96 0.94 
 
Note: A negative value of this coefficient indicates an inverse relationship and vice versa. Normally 
correlation coefficients of a value higher than 0.9 are considered spurious. All analysis has been carried out 
with log values. Hence variables analyzed are Log(Debt/GDP), Log(Capital exp/GDP), Log(Current 
Expenditure/GDP), Log(Real Debt), Log(Real Capital Expenditure) and Log(Real Current Expenditures). 
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Table 3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin Tests for Capital 
Public Expenditure and Public Debt.(Real and Ratio to GDP Variables) 
 
Log Levels First Differences 
General 
Government 
ADF 
Const 
ADF 
Trend 
KPSS 
Const 
KPSS 
Trend 
ADF 
Const 
ADF 
Trend 
KPSS 
Const 
KPSS 
Trend 
Capital 
Expenditure/ 
GDP  
-1.3459 
(0.594) 
-1.5997 
(0.769) 
0.7477 0.2264 
-5.6242 
(0.0001) 
-5.5915 
(0.0004) 
0.4048
** 
0.0405
*** 
Debt/GDP  
-2.3514 
(0.163) 
-2.2158 
(0.464) 
0.8984 0.3200 
-2.9760 
(0.048) 
-3.2926 
(0.0862) 
0.2235
*** 
0.0695
*** 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
0.5957 
(0.987) 
-1.1117 
(0.910) 
0.7699 0.2337 
-6.3735 
(0.0000) 
-6.6434 
(0.0000) 
0.5000
* 
0.0473
*** 
Real Debt 
2.5948 
(1.000) 
-2.2367 
(0.453) 
0.6296
* 
0.1898
* -1.2157 
(0.6543) 
-4.1632 
(0.0153) 
0.4530
* 
0.0862
*** 
Central 
Government 
ADF 
Const 
ADF 
Trend 
KPSS 
Const 
KPSS 
Trend 
ADF 
Const 
ADF 
Trend 
KPSS 
Const 
KPSS 
Trend 
Capital 
Expenditure/ 
GDP 
-0.9210 
(0.767) 
-1.7090 
(0.723)
 0.6093 0.2288
 -5.6942 
(0.000)
 
 
-5.5831 
(0.000) 
 
0.1250
***
 
 
0.1246
** 
 
Debt/GDP 
-1.2759 
(0.625)
 
-1.4565 
(0.818)
 0.7905 0.2288 
-3.5140 
(0.014)
 
-4.0817 
(0.015) 
0.2461
*** 
0.0668
*** 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
-2.2846 
(0.182) 
-3.3524 
(0.075) 
0.6353
* 
0.1140 
-7.0161 
(0.000) 
-6.9485 
(0.000) 
0.1898
*** 
0.1503
** 
Real Debt 
0.6500 
(0.988) 
-1.7039 
 (0.725) 
0.9085 0.2381 
-1.1238 
(0.693) 
-4.1548 
(0.015) 
0.5494
* 
0.0772
*** 
State 
Government 
ADF 
Const 
ADF 
Trend 
KPSS 
Const 
KPSS 
Trend 
ADF 
Const 
ADF 
Trend 
KPSS 
Const 
KPSS 
Trend 
Debt/ GDP 
-2.3442 
(0.165) 
-2.5591 
(0.300) 
0.449
** 
0.084
*** -2.1863 
(0.214) 
-2.3386 
(0.4023) 
0.1724
*** 
0.0926
*** 
Capital 
Expenditure/ 
GDP 
-2.6580 
(0.102) 
-2.3268 
(0.408) 
0.2794 0.1606 
-5.2316 
(0.0002) 
-5.2965 
(0.0009) 
0.2895
*** 
0.2402 
Real Debt 
0.3693 
(0.978) 
-0.6904 
(0.962) 
0.8717 0.2265 
-2.5133 
(0.122) 
-4.9493 
(0.0030) 
0.3028
*** 
0.1045
*** 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
0.7382 
(0.992) 
-1.3836 
(0.846) 
0.7785 0.2248 
-5.1434 
(0.0002) 
-5.8645 
(0.0002) 
0.3960
* 
0.0618
*** 
Note: ADF= augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) ; KPSS= Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992).  
The ADF tests are conducted by setting a lag length (k) of 7 as explained in the test. The KPSS tests are 
reported on the automatic (k) selection of 4 since the sample is small. The ADF tests, ADF Const denotes the 
only constant term in the estimating equation, whereas Trend denotes both the constant term and linear time 
trend. For ADF Trend log values of variables have been used.  Same notations are used for constant and 
trend in the KPSS model.  P-values are reported in brackets  
Critical Values: 
        ADFConst     ADFTrend    KPSSConst   KPSSTrend       
1%     -3.73            -4.33                 0.739           0.216 
5%     -2.99            -3.58                 0.463           0.146 
***  Significant at the 1% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*    Significant at the 10% level 
 
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
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Table 4.VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria (Ratio/GDP and Real variables) 
 
 
Government Variables 
Optimal 
Lag 
Length 
LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
 
 
 
General 
Government 
Public debt/GDP  
and Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
6 -56.6 8.935
 
2.417
* 
6.361
* 
7.619 6.72
* 
Real Public Debt 
and Capital 
Expenditure 
6 -109 11.93
* 
137.961
* 
10.405
 
11.663
 
10.7
* 
Central 
Government 
Public debt/GDP  
and Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
5 - 48.9 5.717
 
0.7264
* 
5.255
* 
6.3116
 
5.56
* 
Real Public Debt 
and Capital 
Expenditure 
3 -112 8.300
 
42.232
* 
9.394
 
10.06
* 
9.59
* 
 
 
State 
Government 
Public debt/GDP  
and Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
7 -9.88 8.827 0.1018
* 
3.067
* 
4.5194 3.48
* 
Real Public Debt 
and Capital 
Expenditure 
7 -56.2 23.35
* 
3.6114
* 
6.636
* 
8.087
* 
7.05
* 
Note: * indicates the criterion according to which the stated lag length is optimal.  
Optimal lag length column indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final Prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion  
 
 
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
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Table 5. Cointegration tests (Selected Variables) 
 
Trace (Eigen value) Statistics        H0 = Rank=r (Central government)-Ratio to GDP Variables 
 
r= 0 
 
r ≤ 1 
Speed of adjustment 
coefficient  
 
Interaction Term 
 
15.0691
**
[0.057] 
(0.2659) 
 
5.1734
**  
[0.022] 
(0.1492) 
 
-0.0459 
 
3.3265(0.07) 
Trace (Eigen value) Statistics         H0 = Rank=r (General Government)-Ratio to GDP Variables 
 
r= 0 
 
r ≤ 1 
Speed of adjustment 
coefficient 
Interaction Term 
 
14.5645
*
 [0.0687] 
(0.2803) 
 
3.8414
**
[0.0366] 
(0.1313) 
 
-0.1394 
 
 
0.2692(0.06) 
Trace (Eigen value) Statistics         H0 = Rank=r (State Government)-Real Variables 
 
r= 0 
 
r ≤ 1 
Speed of adjustment 
coefficient 
Interaction Term 
 
18.5517
**
[0.0168] 
(0.5026) 
 
1.0915 [0.2961] 
(0.0427) 
 
0.06 
 
 
-3.56(1.65) 
Note: P-values are reported in the square brackets for this test. The Eigen-value statistics are reported in 
the round brackets.  For the interaction terms, presented in the last column, the value in the round brackets 
represents the standard error associated with the term. The 5% critical values of  the trace statistics  for H0 
= 0 are 15.49 and for H0  ≤ 1 are  3.84 respectively. The lag lengths used are as per the optimal lag length 
of Table 3.  
***  Significant at the 1% level **    Significant at the 5% level *      Significant at the 10% level 
 
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
 
Table 6. Error Correction Model 
 
General Government R
2 Cointegration equation 
coefficient 
Lag 6 
D (Capital Expenditure/ GDP) 0.70 0.204
***  
-0.84
** 
(0.06) 
Central Government  
Cointegration equation 
coefficient 
Lag 5 
 
D(Capital Expenditure 
/GDP) 
0.61 0.059
*** 
-0.09
*  
(0.237) 
State  Government  
Cointegration equation 
coefficient 
Lag 1 
D(Real Capital Expenditure) 0.63 -0.005
**
 
0.23
** 
(0.06) 
 
Note: P-values are reported in the square brackets for this test. For the Lag coefficients presented in the last 
column, the value in the round brackets represents the standard error associated with the term. The 5% 
critical values of the trace statistics for H0 = 0 are 15.49 and for H0 ≤ 1 are 3.84 respectively. The lag lengths 
used are as per the optimal lag length of Table 3.  
*** Significant at the 1% level   **    Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
 
(Source: Authors Elaboration on RBI data as mentioned in Table 1) 
 
 
 
38 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
A.2.1: VECM (Long Run Properties) and Econometric Relationship between bt  and g1 
 
П’s properties explain the long run properties of the VECM model. 
Rank (П) =0, non stationary with no cointegration 
 
Rank (П) =2, full rank, which means that the system is stationary as a whole even if 
individual series are not  
 
Rank (П) =1, non stationary with 1 cointegrating relationships. 
 
For the Johansen test, the rank of the matrix= number of characteristic roots that differ 
from zero. In case of no cointegration rank of П is 0 and all characteristic roots equal zero.  
1-λi= 0.  
 
If rank (П) =1, which is the case in point here, 0 < λ <1, we have the following model 
which can be represented as a VAR. 
1 2 1
0 1 2
1 2 2
t t t t
t t t t
b b b u
A A A
u  
 
 
       
          
         
The VECM form hence would be 
1 1 1
0 1 2
1 1 2
t t t t
t t t t
b b b u
u  
 
 
        
                     
                                
2
1
i
i
I A

 
    
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
